Philippa Foot (1920-2010) was a British philosopher known for her contributions to ethics, particularly in reviving and reshaping the ancient tradition of virtue ethics. Her work focused on moral philosophy, and she sought to offer an alternative to dominant ethical theories like utilitarianism and deontology.

Through a lifetime of rigorous philosophical inquiry, Foot’s ideas reshaped the landscape of 20th-century moral thought and continue to influence ethical discussions today.

Early Life and Influences

Philippa Foot was born into a prominent British family, and her upbringing immersed her in an intellectually rich environment. Educated at Oxford University, Foot became part of the intellectual circles that shaped post-war British philosophy. Oxford, during this period, was a hotbed of philosophical activity, and Foot’s contemporaries included notable figures such as Iris Murdoch and Elizabeth Anscombe. These interactions, coupled with the influence of Aristotle and David Hume, shaped her approach to moral philosophy.

Anscombe, in particular, played a key role in influencing Foot’s return to Aristotelian ethics, a framework that had largely been overshadowed in favor of modern ethical theories. Foot’s early academic career at Somerville College, Oxford, laid the foundation for her groundbreaking work in ethics.

The Critique of Consequentialism and Deontology

In the mid-20th century, the dominant schools of thought in moral philosophy were consequentialism and deontology. Consequentialism, notably represented by utilitarianism, held that the moral value of an action lies in its outcomes. Deontology, following the ideas of Immanuel Kant, argued that morality is grounded in adherence to rules and duties, irrespective of consequences.

Foot became dissatisfied with both these approaches. She argued that consequentialism, especially in its utilitarian form, was too simplistic in reducing moral judgment to the maximization of pleasure or happiness. She also found deontology’s strict adherence to rules too rigid, particularly when it conflicted with deeply ingrained human values and instincts. Neither theory, in her view, adequately addressed the complexities of human morality.

The Revival of Virtue Ethics

Foot’s dissatisfaction with consequentialism and deontology led her to rediscover virtue ethics, an ancient philosophical tradition most notably advanced by Aristotle. Unlike modern ethical theories, virtue ethics focuses on the character of the moral agent rather than the specific actions they perform. For Foot, morality was not simply about following rules or achieving good outcomes but about developing good character traits—virtues—that align with human nature.

In her seminal work, Virtues and Vices (1978), Foot argued that moral virtues, such as courage, honesty, and justice, are essential to human flourishing. These virtues are not arbitrary; they are grounded in the natural needs and capacities of human beings. According to Foot, a virtuous person is someone who acts in accordance with reason and in ways that promote human well-being, rather than someone who merely follows moral rules or seeks to maximize pleasure.

Natural Goodness and Moral Judgment

One of Foot’s most significant contributions to ethics is her concept of “natural goodness,” developed in her later work Natural Goodness (2001). Here, she posits that moral evaluations are similar to the evaluations we make of living organisms in nature. Just as we assess a plant as flourishing or withering based on how well it fulfills its natural function, we can evaluate human actions based on how they align with the natural human condition.

Foot’s account of moral goodness is rooted in an understanding of human beings as biological creatures with particular needs and capacities. Virtue, in this view, is a kind of excellence that allows individuals to fulfill their natural human functions. This idea was seen as a radical departure from the abstract, universal moral principles that dominated moral philosophy at the time, offering instead a more concrete and grounded approach to moral reasoning.

The Trolley Problem and Foot’s Legacy

Perhaps one of the most famous elements of Foot’s philosophical legacy is her introduction of the “trolley problem,” a thought experiment designed to illuminate the complexities of moral decision-making. The problem presents a scenario where a runaway trolley threatens to kill several people, and a moral agent must decide whether to divert the trolley, killing one person to save many others. This dilemma, initially raised in Foot’s 1967 essay The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect, has since become a staple in discussions of ethics.

The trolley problem reflects Foot’s broader concerns with how moral judgments are made. Rather than simply weighing consequences or applying rigid rules, the thought experiment invites deeper reflection on the values, intentions, and character traits that guide human action. It also highlights the challenges of real-world moral decision-making, where simple solutions are often inadequate.